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Cloud computing nowadays constitutes a substantial portion of new enter-
prise IT spending [4]. Whether signing up for applications deployed as a service,
or outsourcing hosting concerns to third parties, cloud computing is taking us
back to the days of the data center. Virtualization is a key enabler technology
that enables consolidation of hardware utilization and provides the notion of
elastic computing whereby hardware resources are allocated on demand [8]. Mo-
bile devices represent a natural fit to this change in the technology landscape,
be it a means to compensate for their limited storage or a way to fully jus-
tify investment in cloud computing, thereby fueling the bring-your-own-device
(BYOD) concept [1].
This new scenario is uncharted territory for security assurance, which at-
tempts to provide a measure of trustworthiness of security-critical objects pro-
vided by third parties. In this case, enterprise information is being entrusted
to cloud providers and to personal employee mobile devices. When assuring IT
infrastructure, code scanning and penetration testing have become established
audit practices. However, the su ciency or even relevance for the cloud/mobility
computing infrastructure has to be questioned. Recent global security incidents,
namely Heartbleed [5] and Shellshock [10], show that vulnerabilities can go un-
detected for years despite existing practices. The case of targeted attacks gets
even more complicated [13]. Relevance is also of concern. In the case of cloud
computing: should enterprise simply trust the cloud platform’s security stack?
If the answer is negative, how should a company arrange for a penetrating test-
ing exercise on the cloud-hosted, possibly multi-tenant, infrastructure? Mobile
devices complicate the situation even further. One factor that sets them apart
from the rest is their hardware constraints. Therefore, should the lack of installed
scanning software fail security audits or should these devices be exempt? This
decision seems to present one of those impossible practicality-security trade-o↵s.
The argument being put forward in the proposed research direction is that
when the big bug or the resourceful attacker strikes, graceful recovery is key.
The intuition is that information retrievable from kernel/user memory should
trigger recovery. Periodic or trigger-driven physical memory dumps from virtual
machines and mobile devices can be used to assess the current security state
across an IT infrastructure. The value proposition is that memory dumps are
expected to be comparatively much smaller than disk or network dumps, and
can provide a practical solution. On the other hand, the potential e↵ectiveness
is still left for exploration. An e↵ective solution should provide a shift from a
situation where suspicion of a security breach cannot be verified to one where
2not only verification is made possible but that also allows for a timely recovery
to minimize impact.
The use of memory forensics is not new for the domain of computer secu-
rity. Malware forensics is a case in point [7], however the predominantly manual
and non-structured approach poses the main limitation for assurance. Forensic
guidelines suggest for example that process structures in kernel memory could
help spot backdoor installations, while investigating kernel data structures such
as system service descriptor tables could disclose the presence of rootkits. Secu-
rity assurance tools require that the whole process be fully automated in order
to enable a practical audit process. For this to happen existing guidelines require
evolving into proper assurance methods having rigorous measures of e↵ective-
ness that can be tied to security risk levels. In the longer term more substantial
challenges have to be addressed. Mobile devices may not be always accessible
for on-demand memory dumps while their hardware constraints could hinder
complete acquisition. Furthermore, the memory forensics-based assurance pro-
cess should go beyond merely detecting the presence of malware, but rather the
entire ‘who/when/where/how’ forensic spectrum needs answering. This way all
damage can be identified, infection vectors closed down and any attack sources
identified so that trust in the system can be fully regained. Some of the chal-
lenges involved require searching for exploitation residue that could be present
in memory. Also, instructions from code sections combined with register and
data sections content could enable back-tracing to prior program states of foren-
sic interest. Finally, complete situation rectification could require a generic ex-
ploit mitigation mechanism to be put in place rather than a specific patch. Any
(memory) forensically derived information could potentially serve as basis for
such mitigation.
Existing research e↵orts provide promising starting points. Leverage of vir-
tual machine technology to provide cloud security assurance has been investi-
gated in terms of tamper-proof virtual machine snapshots [12]. There are also
various examples that demonstrate how virtualization facilitates the implemen-
tation of various security mechanisms, e.g. control flow integrity (CFI) [2]. Work
in automated dynamic analysis of malware also makes use of memory forensic
techniques [14]. The problem of automated crash dump analysis also starts o↵
with a memory dump and tackles the problem of program state back-tracing
[6], whilst object-code analysis techniques also make use of runtime data struc-
tures e.g. call stacks [3]. Finally, memory forensics should complement disk-based
forensics [9] and network tra c analysis [11]. Correlating the di↵erent forensic
levels should be part of the overall research direction in order to maximize the
available tool-set for investigators. With proper adaptation and combination
with the aforementioned malware forensic guidelines, these existing techniques
could pave the way towards a security assurance process that fits today’s enter-
prise computing needs.
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